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WHEN HOPE No LONGER SPRINGS
ETERNAL:
A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR
EMPLOYEE FALL-OUTS IN SMALL
MEMBER-MANAGED LLCS
INTRODUCTION
In 1977 Wyoming became the first state to recognize Limited
Liability Companies (LLCs);1 by 1996, every state had followed
suit.2 The most commonly credited impetus for the states' rush to
pass LLC statutes is a 1988 Internal Revenue Service ruling 3 ap-
plying single-level, partnership type taxation to Wyoming-style
LLCs. That ruling rendered LLCs more favorable then partner-
ships or close corporations for certain kinds of activities.4 LLCs
have spread, in the words of one commentator, "like wildfire."
5
Prior to the 1988 Revenue Ruling, there were roughly one hundred
LLCs in the United States. 6 By 1991, there were more than 1700.
7
In 1995 over 110,000 new LLC filings were reported by forty-
seven states.8 The LLC form is clearly here to stay, and at least
one commentator predicts that its adoption will "dramatically
I See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 (Michie
2001 & Supp. 2002).
2 See Warren H. Johnson, Note, Limited Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability
Shield Holding Up Under Judicial Scrutiny?, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 177, 184-87 (2000) (dis-
cussing the history of LLCs).
3 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 ("[The LLC] has associates and an objective to
carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, but lacks a preponderance of the four remain-
ing corporate characteristics. Accordingly, [the LLC] is classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes.").
4 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, such activities may typically include
private ventures in particularly risky fields, such as aerospace engineering or biotechnology. In
such cases, the LLC form might be particularly attractive for its limited liability.
5 David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and Limited Liability Company: How
Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility
and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 447
(1998) (discussing the rapid expansion of the LLC business form).
6 Id. at n.108 (citing Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst
Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 402-03 n.46 (1996)).
Cohen, supra note 5, at 440.
8 Id. at 445.
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[change] the law of business organizations and the decision-
making process as it pertains to the choice of business entity." 9
The rush by the states to pass LLC statutes and the meager collec-
tion of LLC case law leaves several key questions unanswered.
This Comment attempts to resolve one such question, namely, ab-
sent contract or operating agreement provisions, what duty does a
member-managed LLC majority owe to member-employees?
A principal feature of the LLC form is the ability to decrease
the duty of loyalty that members owe each other; this stands in
sharp contrast to other business associations such as partnerships
and statutory close corporations, where courts have required a
heightened duty of loyalty between partners or shareholders. Al-
though this may not be a source of problems for sophisticated enti-
ties who professionally account for the risk of failure, at the draft-
ing stage many small member-operated LLCs fail to anticipate the
possibility of future fall-outs between member-employees. Be-
cause many aspects of LLCs are governed by basic contract prin-
ciples, a failure to explicitly contract for such events as termina-
tion and dissolution can lead to substantial problems in situations
where members of an LLC wish to restrain decision-making ability
to employees only.
The issue of fiduciary and loyalty duty in LLCs has been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature ° but almost no attention has
been paid to the particular problems facing member-employees of
LLCs. Using Ohio LLC law" as a prototype, this Comment argues
that the rationale leading to heightened fiduciary and loyalty duties
in other business associations should apply with equal force to
member-employees in member-managed LLCs.
Although this Comment presupposes a basic understanding of
business associations, 12 Part II contains a brief discussion of the
fundamental differences between LLCs and other business associa-
tions. Part III reviews how courts in Ohio have treated partner-
ships and close corporations, particularly in situations where
shareholders or partners have also been employed by the associa-
9 Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Available to the Dissatisfied Par-
ticipant in a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 465,467 (1994).
10 See, e.g., J. Mark Meinhardt, Note, Investor Beware: Protection of Minority Stake-
holder Interests in Closely Held Limited-Liability Business Organizations: Delaware Law and
its Adherents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 288 (2001); Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct
Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 21 (1994); see also Johnson, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 9.
1 Ohio Limited Liability Companies Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58 (West
1994 & Supp. 2002).
12 Specifically the fundamental differences between corporations, close corporations,
partnerships, and LLCs.
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tion. Part IV questions whether LLCs should be treated any dif-
ferently than other business associations in terms of default duties
of loyalty, and Part V concludes that they should not.
I. CONCERNS SPECIIC To LLCs
The LLC is best described as an amalgam of traits borrowed
from partnership and corporate associations. LLCs enjoy the lim-
ited liability of corporate associations while retaining a partner-
ship's ability to be operated by the owners. Day-to-day operations
can be conducted by either members or managers' 3 and like a part-
nership, a private agreement determines the management and
profit-sharing properties of the firm.' 4 In a recent case, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court described a typical LLC statute 5 as "designed
to achieve what is seemingly a simple concept - to permit persons
or entities ("members") to join together in an environment of pri-
vate ordering to form and operate the enterprise under an LLC
agreement with tax benefits akin to a partnership and limited li-
ability akin to the corporate form.' 6 Importantly, as the Delaware
court noted, LLCs allow participants to "engage in private order-
ing with substantial freedom of contract to govern their relation-
ship, provided they do not contravene any mandatory provisions of
[the LLC statute]."' 7
Beyond a bare minimum of statutory requirements, 8 LLCs are
essentially governed by private contracts ("LLC agreements").19
In addition to certain information-sharing requirements,2 ° many
13 See Miller, supra note 9, at 468-69 (noting that operations can be conducted by mem-
bers or managers). An LLC manager does not have to be a member of the LLC unless the LLC
agreement requires otherwise. See, e.g., OHIlO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1705.25(C) (West 1994)
("Except as otherwise provided in the operating agreement, a person who is both a manager and
a member of a limited liability company has the rights and powers of a manager, is subject to
the restrictions and liabilities of a manager, and, to the extent of his membership interest, has the
rights and powers of a member and is subject to the restrictions and liabilities of a member.").
14 See Miller, supra note 9, at 469.
15 Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (1999 &
Supp. 2000) (resembling Ohio's LLC Act).
16 Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999) (holding that an
LLC Agreement was binding as to forum jurisdiction and discussing the properties of LLCs).
17 Id. at 290.
18 See infra note 20.
19 What this Comment refers to as an LLC agreement is sometimes referred to as an oper-
ating agreement or LLC contract.
20 Beyond those duties founded in principles of equity (borrowed from the corporate and
partnership form of enterprise), an Ohio LLC owes certain statutory responsibilities to all mem-
bers. If there is no contrary provision in the operating agreements, an LLC has an obligation to:
provide certain records to each of its members, give each member the opportunity to vote as
provided in the operating agreement, and make equal distributions to all members when distri-
butions are made. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.11(B), .22, .26 (West 1994 & Supp.
2002).
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state statutes provide default provisions that can be muted by pro-
visions in an LLC agreement. In some states, the ability to pri-
vately structure a firm is so extensive as to grant the LLC agree-
ment drafters the discretion to excuse LLC members from almost
any consequences for their behavior. 21
The freedom with which LLC fiduciary duties can be altered
raises the concern that LLC minorities can be squeezed out by
LLC majorities without recourse. Although a purist might argue
that such an outcome is consistent with the principles of private
ordering upon which LLCs are founded, the question of inequita-
ble result has been the subject of at least one scholarly work.22 A
more narrow issue is whether employee-members of LLCs should
be offered remedies outside of those explicitly stated in an LLC
agreement in the event of squeeze-outs or freeze-outs by other
LLC members.
II. How COURTS HAVE TREATED OTHER BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS
In other organizational forms, courts adjudicating disputes
have had the luxury of expansive precedent, often resulting in ad-
ditional safeguards for non-controlling stakeholders.23 Because of
the LLC's relative youth in American law, they do not enjoy such
a rich history.24 In the absence of precedent, courts and current
LLC members should examine how other corporate forms have
been treated. Close corporations, like LLCs, are a fusion of
corporations and partnerships, and close corporation cases can
provide guidance through the gaps in LLC precedent.
A. In Firms for Which Ownership Stakes are Illiquid, Stakeholders
Owe Each Other a Heightened Duty of Care
In partnerships and close corporations, participants owe each
other a high duty of care. That duty is breached when a stake-
holder uses his or her power to deprive others of an equal opportu-
nity to share in a benefit. Under the heightened standard, each
stakeholder has an obligation to act with the highest regard for the
21 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-306 (1999) ("[a] limited liability company
agreement may provide that: (1) A member who fails to perform in accordance with, or to com-
ply with the terms and conditions of, the limited liability company agreement shall be subject to
specified penalties or specified consequences." (emphasis added)).
22 See Miller, supra note 9.
23 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Child Care of Irvine v. Facchina, No. CIV.A. 16227, 1998 WL 409363, at *6
(Del. Ch. July 15, 1998) (noting that "[u]nlike the rich body of corporate law decisions that
often provide members of this Court with at least an intuitive sense about the parties' likelihood
of prevailing in this matter, in this dispute [the judge does] not enjoy the luxury of interpretive
decisions upon which to make a reasoned judgment").
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principles of good faith and fair dealing.25 In cases involving em-
ployee-shareholders or employee-partners, courts have consistently
applied (or alluded to) a substantially higher requirement of loy-
alty.26 The heightened standard in small organizations has its roots
in one of the earliest and most influential decisions regarding part-
27
nerships, Meinhard v. Salmon.
1. Partnerships and the Meinhard Duty of Loyalty
Partnerships are the most straightforward association in terms
of fiduciary duty, following what is effectively a common-sense
approach to loyalty. Partners are liable for the obligations of the
partnership,28 and each general partner has the ability to bind the
partnership to obligations incurred in the course of the partnership
business. 29 Because of the ease, and subsequent danger with which
partners can hobble each other with partnership debts, courts have
consistently applied the highest possible requirement of good faith
dealing among partners.
30
Meinhard is one of the earliest cases to resolve the issue of
partnership duty and is also one of the most oft-quoted in modern
American corporate law.3' Determining that the defendant
breached his duty to the plaintiff, his partner, by arranging a num-
ber of favorable business deals to the exclusion of the plaintiff,
Judge Cardozo wrote that "U]oint adventurers, like copartners,
owe to one another . . . the duty of the finest loyalty 3 2 and that
"[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fidu-
ciary ties. 'A Cardozo wrote that "[a] trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior. 3 4 The Meinhard test survives to this day 35 and
2 See generally Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
partner-employees in Ohio close-corporations owe each other a duty of the highest loyalty).
26 Id.
27 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
28 See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997) (Partner's Liability).
29 See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1997) (Partner Agent of Partnership).
30 See, e.g., Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545.
31 A Shepard's report of citations to Meinhard on October 5, 2002, revealed more than
1,400 citing references.
32 Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
33 Id.
34 Id.
3 See Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of
Doctrine, 22 CARDOZo L. REV. 51, 53 (2000):
Meinhard has aged well. No case of its period is of comparable con-
temporary influence in the business law area. Meinhard is cited today
5892002]
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is the baseline duty applied by most courts in general partner-
ships, 36 including those in Ohio. 37 As such, absent explicit provi-
sions in a Partnership Agreement,38 courts will require the utmost
standard of good faith in dealings between partners employed by
their partnership.
2. Close Corporations
Shareholders of close corporations do not enjoy the remedies
available to shareholders of large publicly traded corporations.
For non-publicly traded companies, particularly those involved in
unique businesses for which there is a relatively small market, it
can be difficult or impossible to value an ownership stake. This
problem is compounded in the case of small firms that are engaged
in "knowledge work" with no tangible product or inventory, like
advertising or asset-management firms. Close corporations present
unique opportunities for minority-shareholder oppression, particu-
larly when a minority shareholder is in the employ of the majority.
for the power and vitality of the idea it expresses rather than as a window
to an era the values of which have long since been abandoned. The
'punctilio of an honor' precept is as enduring as any expression of part-
nership or corporate law and continues to guide courts in determining the
duties business partners owe one another.
36 See, e.g., Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981) (refusing to dis-
miss a suit by limited partners against general partners for causing the sale of the limited part-
ners' shares at an inadequate price, the court noted that "It is ... clear that a partner owes a
fiduciary duty to the other partners at common law"); Slattery v. Bower, 924 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir.
1991) (applying the Meinhard duty to a close corporation); Dardovitch v. Halmon, No. CIV.A.
97-52, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207, at *39 (E.D. Pa. January 14, 1998) (involving a trustee of a
corporation), rev'd on other grounds, 190 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1999); Granik v. Perry, 418 F.2d
832, 836 (5th Cir. 1969) ("Florida also recognizes the fiduciary relationships which arise from
the more particularized situation of a joint venture"); In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231,
234 (6th Cir. 1941) ("We uphold the standard of [the Meinhard] doctrine" to a situation involv-
ing the directors of a close corporation accused of self-dealing); In re Combined Metal Reduc-
tion Co., 557 F.2d 179, 196 (9th Cir. 1977) ("It is well established that a trustee in a reorganiza-
tion is required to act in accordance with the highest standards."); Bakalis v. Bressler, 115
N.E.2d 323, 326 (I11. 1953) ("Each of the partners occupied a fiduciary relation to the other, and
each was therefore bound to the utmost good faith in all dealings and transactions that affected
the other in the partnership business. Since Bressler was the managing partner the duty rested
more heavily on him.").
31 See Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 178-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Meinhard with approval).
38 For example, the Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership agreement may
not:
eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 604(b)(3), but: (i)
the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activity that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unrea-
sonable; or (ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in
the partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of
all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would vio-
late the duty of loyalty.
UNIF. P'SHIp ACT § 103(b)(3) (1997) (Effect of Partnership Agreement).
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For this reason, courts have consistently recognized a heightened
duty among close corporation shareholders, particularly in cases
involving employee-shareholders.39
In Ohio, the resemblance between close corporations and
partnerships, particularly the restriction on alienability of owner-
ship shares and shareholder-management, "has permitted courts to
venture outside the laws of corporations 'to borrow from allied
disciplines those principles and rules which seem best to comport
with the mixed nature of the close corporation form.''4° The ra-
tionale that Ohio has used in dealing with close corporations will
likely arise in similar cases involving LLCs.
The issue of fiduciary duty in Ohio close corporations first
arose in Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply Inc.,4t a 1984 Ohio
Court of Appeals decision. There, the defendant close corporation,
helmed by CEO Ralph Grimme, purchased the shares of Grimme's
mother at book value without informing the other shareholders.42
When the corporation, controlled by the Grimme family, refused to
purchase minority shareholder Dorothy Schroer's shares, she (and
later her estate) sued and won an order, affirmed on appeal, that
the corporation had to purchase her shares at the same price basis
as the other shares. The appeals court held that "the holders of a
closely held stock in a corporation ... bear a fiduciary duty to deal
fairly, honestly, and openly with their fellow stockholders and to
make disclosure of all essential information. 43 The appeals court
reasoned that the close corporation blended features from the cor-
porate and partnership form and therefore imposed a similar duty.44
In Schroer, the Ohio appellate court adopted the reasoning of
a classic Massachusetts case, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Com-
pany.45 That case, frequently cited in close corporation cases ,46
arose when the majority shareholders/directors of a family-
controlled business (the Rodds) attempted to buy out the shares of
Harry Rodd, the company's retiring patriarch. The offer was not
extended to the survivors of Joseph Donahue, an employee from
-9 See, e.g., Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (applying heightened
duty of loyalty among shareholder-employees of a close-corporation).
40 Id. at 648 (citing Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984)).
41 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
42 After purchasing Agnes Grimme's shares, the corporation purchased shares belonging
to Ralph Grimme's brother. Id. at 977.
43 Id. at 980 (citing with approval Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941,
945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)).
Id. at 979.
45 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
46 A Shepard's report on September 29, 2002, for Rodd revealed more then 450 citing
sources.
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1935 to his death in 1971, and one of the only shareholders who
was not a member of the Rodd family.47 Donahue's wife sued,
seeking to either rescind the purchase of Harry Rodd's shares or to
compel the purchase of Joseph's shares. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal, noting that when
close corporations have "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2)
no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial major-
ity stockholder participation in the management, direction, and
operations of the corporation... [then the close corporation] bears
a striking resemblance to a partnership. 48 Since shareholders of-
ten have a substantial investment in the close corporation and an
expectation of job security, if a minority shareholder is oppressed
or "frozen OUt ' 49 by the majority, he or she "cannot afford to wait
passively" 50 for a change in management policy and must liquidate
assets to his or her disadvantage. 51 Because of the close resem-
blance between partnerships and close corporations, the Donahue
court adopted the Meinhard rule of partnership fiduciary duty and
required "the finest loyalty' 52 to close corporation shareholders.53
Donahue appears to be the law in Ohio, although it has never
been directly applied. In the 1989 case of Crosby v. Beam,54 the
Ohio Supreme Court examined whether minority shareholders of a
closely-held corporation should be allowed to bring direct actions
against corporate directors, or whether their remedy should be lim-
ited to shareholder derivative suits. Crosby, a minority share-
holder in a closely-held corporation sued the controlling share-
holders claiming that they unjustly enriched themselves with cor-
47 Rodd, 328 N.E.2d at 509-10.
48 Id. at 511-12. ("Commentators and courts have noted that the close corporation is often
little more than an 'incorporated' or 'chartered' partnership.") Id. at 512.
49 A "freeze-out" is a scheme by a majority to withhold dividends or salary from a minor-
ity shareholder, constructively forcing the minority shareholder to sell his or her shares at an
inequitable price - more generally, the oppression of the minority by the majority. Id. at 513
("The minority is vulnerable to a variety of oppressive devices, termed "freeze-outs," which the
majority may employ.").
50 Id. at 514.
51 Id. The court noted that:
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a close corpo-
ration becomes manifest. He cannot easily reclaim his capital. In a large
public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could
sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital. By defi-
nition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.
Id. at 515. The court went on to discuss how remedies available to disaffected partners in forced
dissolutions are not available to shareholders in a close corporation who may be "trapped in a
disadvantageous situation." Id.
52 Id. at 516.
51 Id. at 515. The court expanded its holding to include both majority and minority share-
holders. Id. at 515, n.17.
- 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989).
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porate funds, improperly used corporate funds against the best in-
terest of the corporation, and conspired civilly to commit the
same.55 Traditional standing requirements precluded Crosby from
bringing the suit directly, and his claim was dismissed at trial. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's reversal of the
lower court, thereby extending the right to bring direct action to
shareholders in close corporations.
56
In arriving at its holding, the court collaterally resolved the is-
sue of duties owed to minority shareholders in close corporations.
The Crosby court noted that the close corporation form provides
unique opportunities to oppress minority shareholders, for exam-
ple, by refusing to declare dividends.57 Because of this risk, the
court adopted a heightened duty of loyalty for shareholders in a
close corporation, much like the duty owed between partners in a
partnership, because of "the fundamental resemblance between the
close corporation and a partnership. 58 The Crosby court wisely
observed that "[i]n essence, the ownership of a close corporation is
limited to a small number of people who are dependent on each
other for the enterprise to succeed" 59 and "j]ust like a partnership,
the relationship between the shareholders must be one of trust,
confidence and loyalty if the close corporation is to thrive., 60 The
court held that "[w]here majority or controlling shareholders in a
close corporation breach their heightened fiduciary duty to minor-
ity shareholders by utilizing their majority control of the corpora-
tion to their own advantage, without providing minority sharehold-
ers with an equal opportunity to benefit, such breach, absent a le-
gitimate business purpose, is actionable.",6' The Crosby court con-
cluded with the just proviso that "[c]ontrol of the stock in a close
corporation cannot be used to give the majority benefits which are
not shared by the minority.,
62
55 Id. at 217.
56 Id. at 221.




61 Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
62 Id. (citing Alaska Plastics Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980)).
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B. In the Partnership and Close Corporation Form, Stakeholder-
Employees Have an Expectation of Continued Employment or Just
Cause Termination.
In Gigax v. Repka,63 the plaintiff and two defendants were the
sole shareholders of an Ohio close corporation. At the formation
of the close corporation, the parties agreed that each of them
would work for the corporation. Plaintiff and defendants had
equal ownership of the stock and drew equal salaries. However,
there was no written agreement. In 1992, the defendants termi-
nated Plaintiff, alleging poor performance. Plaintiff sued for
breach of duty and lost at trial, but the verdict was reversed on ap-
peal. The appeals court stated that a minority shareholder who is a
director of a close corporation is more than simply an at-will em-
ployee.64
The Gigax court reiterated that partners' fiduciary duty to
each other requires that a termination of a partner-employee be for
a legitimate business reason. Noting the similarities between close
corporations and partnerships, the court found that close corpora-
tion "participants often consider themselves as partners inter sese
while obtaining the advantages of the corporate form . . . [That]
resemblance has permitted Courts to venture outside the laws of
corporations 'to borrow from allied disciplines those principles
and rules which seem best to comport with the mixed nature of a
close corporation., 65 To determine whether a termination is ac-
ceptable, a court must "[balance] the need to protect the minority
shareholder-employee with the needs of the close corporation in
ridding itself of the unproductive or troublesome employee. 66
In Gigax, the court found that the plaintiff had not been re-
moved for legitimate business reasons. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court considered evidence demonstrating that each part-
ner experienced a decline in profitability at some time since the
company's formation, as well as an admission by the defendants
that the decline of profitability in the jobs assigned to Plaintiff was
not necessarily attributable to him. The court was also sensitive to
the fact that, prior to Plaintiff's dismissal, the defendants failed to
63 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
64 Id. at 649 ("We disagree with the finding that employee/shareholder/directors in a close
corporation are at-will employees terminable at any time by the majority or controlling share-
holder/directors.").
65 Id. at 648 (quoting Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply Co., 482 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984)).
66 Id. at 650.
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inform him of their dissatisfaction with his performance.67 In this
respect, the Gigax court was appropriately weary of the delicate
balance between an equitable outcome and interfering with the
freedom to do business.
III. SHOULD LLCs BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER
CORPORATE FoRMs?
A. In the Absence of an Explicit Clause in an LLC Agreement,
Stakeholder Relations in LLCs, Particularly in the Case of
Stakeholder-Employees, Should be Treated In the Same Manner As
Close Corporations Have Been.
In Ohio, fiduciary duty can be reduced, and possibly elimi-
nated, through an express provision in an LLC operating agree-
ment.68 However, if the parties do not draft an alteration of duty in
the LLC operating agreement, then the default duty should be one
of utmost loyalty. Since an LLC shares the fundamental traits of a
close corporation, the members of an LLC should owe each other
the same duty of loyalty that partners in a partnership owe each
other or that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe each
other. In short, there is no justification for leaving minority stake-
holders at risk for indiscriminate abuse by the majority.
B. LLC Stakeholders Who Are Also Employees of the LLC Have an
Expectation of Continued Employment and Deserve the Highest
Possible Duty of Loyalty from Other Stakeholders.
Since the private-ordering principle is so fundamental to the
value of the LLC as a business association, any rule that attempts
to look past an explicit clause in the LLC agreement would be
dangerously short-sighted, and incompatible with the core LLC
principle of private ordering. 69 One remedy that is consistent with
the contract principles upon which LLCs are founded is to require
all employee-stakeholders of LLCs to obtain written employment
contracts specifically stating the terms upon which termination is
70proper.
67 Id. ("[The other partners] admitted in their testimonies that the decline of profitability in
the jobs assigned to Gigax was not necessarily attributable to him, and that Gigax was not ap-
prised of his partner's dissatisfaction with his profitability prior to his removal.").
68 McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1215 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (hold-
ing that "a contract may define the scope of fiduciary duties between parties to the contract").
69 See Miller, supra note 9, at 474 ("[LLCs are] governed largely through the direction of
an operating or managing agreement."). See generally supra, note 16 and accompanying text.
70 Should this remedy be adopted, requiring that LLC agreements stipulate the manner in
which the stake of a disassociated member is to be valued, would be of great assistance in
2002]
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Unfortunately, LLC participants caught in the optimistic grip
of a new venture may be unwilling, or simply unaware of the need,
to recognize and plan for the possibility of dissolution or disaffec-
tion. Although a barrier to recovery in the absence of such con-
tracts would surely have the effect of encouraging rapid change, it
would be unjust to impose such a cold and indiscriminate rule.71
As such, courts adjudicating disputes without prior planning by
LLC participants should adopt a more comprehensive, functional-
ist rule to determine whether there is a heightened duty of loyalty
and fair dealing owed a stakeholder-employee.
C. A Proposed Rule
In cases where the duty of loyalty has not been spelled out in
an LLC agreement or employment contract, an ideal test would
first ask whether the LLC resembles a close corporation by using
the Donahue formulation. 72 That is, to ask whether: (1) there are a
small number of stakeholders; (2) there is no ready market for the
stakes; and (3) there is substantial majority stakeholder participa-
tion in the management and operations of the firm.73 If all three
criteria are answered affirmatively, stakeholders in the LLC should
qualify for the Meinhard duty of "finest loyalty. 74 In such or-
ganizations, stakeholder A violates this duty if (1) without a le-
gitimate business reason, she (2) uses her position and influence to
(3) extend benefits to (4) parties similarly situated75 to stakeholder
avoiding future conflicts. Valuation of a membership stake in an LLC can be extremely diffi-
cult, as LLCs are often engaged in highly specialized activities, and the book value of the assets
encompassed by a membership stake can be grossly out of step with the going-concem valua-
tion. Along these lines, it is easy to envision a situation in which an LLC agreement requiring
departing members to sell their membership stake to the firm for book value produces some
degree of forfeiture, or, similarly, that a firm does not have the liquid assets to purchase a de-
parting members stake as valued by a going-concem method. Suffice to say, valuation of own-
ership interest for which there is no apparent market is just one barrier to disaffected members
and is best addressed through careful planning and contracting at the time of LLC formation.
71 For example, such a rule could result in the sanctioning of a member-employee's ouster
based an a decision that would only benefit certain other similarly situated members.
72 See supra Part ll.A.2.
73 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company, 328 N.E.2d 505, 522 (Mass. 1975).
74 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
75 To elaborate, assume that B is a secretary of Widgets Unlimited, a statutory LLC with
privately traded classified ownership shares. Over the years, B has amassed a small amount of
LLC ownership shares, available to employees for profit-sharing and incentive purposes. Per
his employment agreement and the LLC agreement, B can purchase additional shares at the
price of two dollars. At the end of the fiscal year, Widgets Unlimited falls on hard times. Faced
with the prospect of immediate bankruptcy, C, a large investment bank, swoops in and agrees to
provide life support funding for the LLC in exchange for convertible debt. According to the
terms of the debt agreement, should Widgets Unlimited default, C's debt will convert into own-
ership shares of the type B currently owns. The net effect of this transaction is that, in the event
of default, C will have acquired a controlling percentage of Widgets Unlimited shares at a price
substantially less then two dollars a share. B sues, claiming that the LLC has discriminated
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B without (5) giving B an equal opportunity to share in (6) those
specific benefits. 76 In the context of a stakeholder-employee, such
a duty would be violated if, for example, for no reason relating to
employee performance, a routine distribution of profits was made
to majority stakeholders and not to a minority stakeholder.
The above test should apply not only to outright termination
or squeeze-out/freeze-out situations, but also to operational issues
such as compensation and workplace quality-of-life. 77 The princi-
ples discussed above logically extend to scenarios falling short of
outright termination, as the equitable factors necessitating protec-
tion of minority stakeholders (like depending on the firm for live-
lihood) apply proportionately to lesser degrees of discrimination.
The reduction of an employee-stakeholder's compensation or other
factors that might contribute to an employee's constructive dis-
charge should also fall under the Donahue/Meinhard purview. For
example, under this reasoning, a controlling stakeholder may only
reduce a stakeholder-employee's compensation if (1) the control-
ling stakeholder's actions are warranted by legitimate business
purposes (such as encouraging an improvement in performance by
the stakeholder-employee or a shift in economic factors); (2) the
majority stakeholders inform the stakeholder-employee that his or
her performance is inadequate prior to the reduction of compensa-
tion; and (3) they do not act with the sole purpose of ousting the
stakeholder-employee for the controlling stakeholder's benefit, as
opposed to the firm's benefit. Evidence of unilateral action taken
against him, and breached its fiduciary duty by not allowing him to buy a smaller quantity of
convertible debt for the proportionately same price as C. Here, in the absence of bad faith or
self-dealing, B should not prevail, as B, an individual of limited means, is clearly not in the
position to offer the same scale, quantity, or quality of benefits in exchange for convertible debt
as C, a large and experienced investor. Although it may very well come to be that B and C are
similarly situated as owners of Widgets Unlimited ownership shares, at which time the two are
similarly situated and thus in a relationship requiring a high fiduciary duty, at the time C ac-
quires the convertible debt, there has been no breach of duty.
76 "Those benefits" refers to the specific benefits extended to one or some, but not all, of
the stakeholders.
77 Many LLC statutes contemplate the establishment of compensation schemes for stake-
holders. For example, Ohio allows a majority of the voting interest of an LLC to establish rea-
sonable compensation for members, managers, and officers. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1705.31(A)(3) (West 1994). Courts dealing with similar situations in the closely-held corpora-
tion context have been sensitive to the possibility that shareholders may rely entirely on a form
of compensation from the company. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("The stockholder may have
anticipated that his salary from his position with the corporation would be his livelihood."). In
this respect, so long as there is no self dealing, such as paying officers disproportionately large
salaries, any reasonable compensation plan should be acceptable to a court. See generally
Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) ("[Tlhe close corporation structure also
gives majority or controlling shareholders opportunities to oppress minority shareholders. For
example, the majority ... may grant majority shareholders-officers exorbitant salaries and bo-
nuses.").
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without either a formal meeting or a chance for the stakeholder-
employee to defend himself or herself will cut against a finding of
legitimacy.
In applying this rule to LLCs, courts must be sensitive to the
possibility that they could, in theory, be made complicit in a "re-
verse freeze-out." Such an event, perhaps more aptly entitled a
reverse-hijack, would involve a stakeholder using a court to force
his or her will upon the majority under the guise of broken duties
of loyalty. Although such an admittedly remote situation may
seem unlikely, it is imperative that courts distinguish between
cases of actual stakeholder oppression, and cases of the majority
causing unfortunate results for the stakeholder by simply exercis-
ing its will to further the ends of the firm. Courts should instruct
juries to use evidentiary factors, such as secret meetings, improper
or uneven distributions, and quality and quantity of information




Although a majority's exercise of control over an enterprise is
certainly not in and of itself a breach of duty, courts have generally
taken a protectionist approach to the rights of minority owners.
A small, member-managed LLC bears many of the same character-
istics as a close corporation, most notably an encumbrance on, or
outright prohibition of, the transfer of ownership interest. 80  Be-
cause there is generally little or no market for ownership interest in
small specialized firms the classic market solution of simply
dumping shares on the open market is not available to members of
close corporations and LLCs who disagree with a management de-
cision. Despite the baseline rules for information sharing found in
many LLC statutes, a minority stakeholder is bound by the ma-
jority's decisions whether or not he or she personally benefits.
Because of the key similarities among partnerships, close cor-
porations, and LLCs, if the issue of LLC default loyalty ever
reaches a court, a member-managed LLC should be treated like a
78 Such factors might include examining what is to be gained by the plaintiff (besides a
right to share in the benefits created by the defendant) should he or she prevail, evidence of how
prejudiced a plaintiff truly is by an act of another stakeholder (for example, although a billion-
aire partner in a small venture certainly has the same right not to be frozen out as any other
party, the billionaire might not require as high a level of protection as a wage-earning em-
ployee), and evidence of animosity between the parties as an ulterior motive for bringing suit.
79 See supra Part III.
80 For example, an LLC organized to provide dental hygiene to the public may prohibit
the sale of a membership interest to a non-dentist.
81 See supra note 20.
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close corporation for the purposes of loyalty, at least in the pres-
ence of the factors enumerated above. Although courts must
strive to uphold the key LLC principle of private ordering, they
must at the same time be sensitive to inequitable results affecting
employee-stakeholders. In practice, many stakeholders in small
LLCs are constructively at the behest of the LLC majority, and can
be frozen or squeezed out with relative ease; courts must carefully
balance the policy interests of private ordering to avoid unjust out-
comes for minority stakeholder-employees.
JORDAN L. STRAUSS t
12 By definition, LLCs can be crafted to be very different; each is unique, and an LLC that
does not fit into the factors described above may not need to be treated as advocated in this
Comment.
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